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The international community, following the September 11, 2001 events and the subsequent outbreak 
of war in Afghanistan “rediscovered” the strategic importance of the Central Asian region. Germany 
was among the first countries to pay more attention to this region. However, Berlin already had 
decades of experience of dealing with major issues in Central Asia. Germany was the first European 
country to recognize Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and as 
early as 1992 it sent various diplomatic missions to the region. Now Germany is showing even 
greater interest in forging closer relations, both politically and economically, with these five Central 
Asian governments. 
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Yet, the lack of improvement in the democratization process in the Central Asian countries could 
negatively affect these relations in the not-too-distant future (the recent deterioration in the German-
Uzbek relationship is a sign of that). Such a development could seriously put at risk the successful 
implementation of the German (officially European Union) strategy for Central Asia.[1] 
Germany’s interest in Central Asia 
At first sight, the massive and willfully promoted presence of Germany in all five Central Asian 
states, all relatively poor countries by world standards, appears somewhat absurd. Nevertheless, 
substantial human and financial resources are being allocated to the region by Germany, and a 
recent increase in the numbers of German staff, supported by some European Union (EU) officials, 
testifies to the seriousness of Germany‟s plans for that part of the world. Berlin has created a 
network in which its diplomatic missions are supported by numerous economic and development 
institutions, such as the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ, German 
Society for International Cooperation), the Bankengruppe (KfW, German Development Bank) and 
cultural bodies, such as the Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst (DAAD, German Academic 
Exchange Service), the Deutschen Volkshochschul-Verbandes e.V. (DVV, German Adult Education 
Association), the Welthungerhilfe (emergency aid), the Goethe Institute, the Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung (KAS, policy expertise) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftun (FES, think tank). In Almaty, 
Kazakhstan, the Germans have established the Kazakh-German KGU University. It is interesting to 
note that German is one of the most widely spoken foreign languages in the five countries making 
up the Central Asian region.  
 
Berlin‟s motivation in creating a network of cultural institutions and economic programs in the 
region is many sided. Reinhard Krumm, in his paper “Central Asia, the struggle for power, energy 
and human rights”[2] suggests that this has taken three chronologically distinct phases, in each of 
which German interests have changed (although it would perhaps be more correct to say that new 
interests have been added in the light of changes in external conditions). In the period immediately 
following the five republics‟ independence, Berlin was primarily interested in protecting the 
approximately one million ethnic Germans who had lived in the region since their deportation to that 
region during the Second World War (through an edict of August 28, 1941, Joseph Stalin personally 
ordered the deportation in mass of ethnic Germans from the Volga region to Central Asia). 
This displaced population (concentrated mainly in Kazakhstan, and to a lesser extent Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan) is the key to understanding why political relations between Germany and the five 
Central Asian republics have been so intense since the early nineties. At the beginning of the 2000s, 
however, more interest was stirred by the rich energy resources (oil and gas) yet to be found in the 
region. This was clearly explained in a 1998 document presented by the German Social Democratic 
Party and entitled “Zukunftsregion Kaspisches Meer” (“the Future of the Caspian Sea”[3]). 
The September 11, 2001 attacks on America marked a critical turning point in German policy 
towards Central Asia, which became for Berlin an area of strategic importance in the fight against 
international terrorism. The German strategy, outlined in the “Central Asia Concept” of March 18, 
2002, was summarized by the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle in last November 
during his visit to Astana: “If we are to ensure the success of the political process of reconciliation 
in Afghanistan, then it is crucial that neighboring countries become involved, that they (...) are 
politically engaged but have also such strong links with the Afghan economy that it can develop 
favorably.”[4] 
Berlin‟s interests in the Central Asian region are also predominant in the economic sphere and are 
keeping growing. These German economic interests there in Central Asia are certainly not limited to 
oil and natural gas, though these continue to be a primary focus - for instance, on March 14-15 next 
year Berlin will host the “Turkmenistan Oil & Gas Road Show 2012.”[5] Equally important are 
German exports of machinery, vehicles and chemicals to the five republics, especially at a time 
when the global economic crisis has led to a decline in global demand for such products, which have 
always been the backbone of the German economy. 
Political relations, but not good ones 
Since the early nineties Germany has maintained good relations with the political leaders of all the 
republics of the region. The results are seen in the frequent visits by senior government officials, 
conclusions of economic agreements and a flurry of political activity by a growing number of 
German companies. The intensity of cooperation in the cultural sector is another indication of the 
intensity of these relations. To cite just one example, a “Year of Germany in Kazakhstan”[6] was 
celebrated in Kazakhstan, the main German partner in the region, between February 2009 and 
February 2010. During the Kazakhstani President‟s visit to Germany in 2010 Berlin decided to 
reciprocate by proclaiming the “Year of Kazakhstan in Germany.” There have been numerous 
mutual visits made over the last few years by top government officials of both countries, including 
one to Astana by German federal President Horst Koelher in September 2009, during which a series 
of official documents were signed, including six trade agreements. In 2010 Angela Merkel, the 
German Chancellor, twice visited Astana to sign a series of “investment memorandums.”[7] More 
recently, on July 20, 2011, Westerwelle met his Kazakh counterpart in Berlin. A few days earlier in 
Karaganda was held the 5th meeting of the “German-Kazakh Intergovernmental Working Group on 
Business and Trade” (RAG). 
Germany‟s relations with the five Central Asian republics seem therefore to continue to be 
strengthened over time. However, a closer analysis reveals some hidden weaknesses and inherent 
risks in Berlin‟s relations with these young states. These were brought to the forefront by the recent 
friction between the German and Uzbek governments. Berlin had planned for a German delegation 
to visit Tashkent in November 2010 to hold bilateral meetings with the Uzbek government and 
parliament in order to discuss human rights in the region. The visit was, however, rejected through a 
statement from the Uzbek foreign ministry. Frictions between the two governments also increased in 
August 2011, when the Uzbek authorities in Tashkent took control of Steinert Industries, a major 
German-owned bakery. Not even the German Ambassador, Wolfgang Neuen, was subsequently 
allowed entry into the facility.[8] 
Tashkent‟s behavior in this matter was most likely prompted by President Karimov‟s desire to 
impose tight control over the national economy. As early as 1993 he issued a decree establishing a 
national economic model which on the one hand supported the opening up of the country to 
international trade but at the same time maintained strict governmental control over the goods and 
services coming in and out of the country. The presence and expansion of large German companies 
in the country may have been interpreted as a threat to the Uzbek government‟s control of the 
economy. The punitive action taken against the bakery was probably meant as a way to send a clear 
message to Berlin. 
 
On the other hand, this unexpected reaction alone does not explain Tashkent‟s current discontent 
with Germany. Karimov‟s recent attitude could equally be read as a reaction to the Bundestag‟s May 
19 investigation into violations of human rights in Uzbekistan. On May 19, 2011, six years almost to 
the day after the Andijan massacre, during which about 800 people were killed after the Uzbek 
security forces opened fire on demonstrators in this eastern region of Uzbekistan, four members of 
the German Parliament (Viola von Cramon, Johannes Pflug, Dagmar Enkelmann and Volker Beck) 
officially called on Chancellor Angela Merkel to raise the cases of Akzam Turgunov and twelve 
other human rights defenders unjustly imprisoned and tortured by the government of Uzbekistan.[9] 
Tashkent must not have liked this initiative, and Karimov is probably now sending to the Berlin 
government a clear message that he will not accept any kind of German interference in Uzbekistan‟s 
internal affairs.  
Human rights 
It is increasingly evident that the speed of democratization in the Central Asian states will to a large 
extent determine the success or failure of the German strategy towards the “stans.” The key issue 
here is to define the optimal strategy for ensuring the maintenance of the close ties which bind 
Germany to this key region, an indispensable bridge between Europe and Asia.  
Until recently, Berlin has favored a very tolerant attitude towards the authoritarian regimes of the 
five Central Asian republics. This has set the tone for the relationship between Berlin and Tashkent. 
In consequence, strong pressure from the German government has persuaded the EU in November 
2009 to finally (and reluctantly) lift the sanctions – including an arms embargo – imposed on 
Uzbekistan following the May 15, 2005 Andijan massacre.[10] Between 2005 and 2009 Berlin did 
not comply with EU sanctions anyway, and continued to support the Uzbek president – for example, 
Germany paid 67.9 million euros to Tashkent between 2005 and 2009 to cover the costs of using the 
Termez military base, which provides essential logistical support for the German troops deployed in 
Afghanistan. During the same period, in breach of the Europe-wide ban on Uzbek officials imposed 
by Brussels (penalties were attached to EU members hosting visits by members of the Uzbek 
government), Berlin allowed the Uzbek Interior Minister, Zokir Almatov, to travel to Germany for 
medical treatment.[11] Since 2010, Germany has granted the Uzbek government an additional 15.9 
million euros a year as “financial compensation” for its use of the Termez base, even though 
Tashkent has demonstrated no real will to respect human rights of its citizens, as the EU demands. 
 
Putting the moral considerations involved in these disbursements aside, one cannot pin the slightest 
hope for success on any strategy based on the appeasement of Tashkent‟s anti-democratic policy. 
Berlin‟s disinterest in dealing with human rights issues in Uzbekistan means a huge loss of 
bargaining power. Its passivity is now more likely to enhance the level of blackmail undertaken by 
the Uzbek government. This will only strengthen Tashkent‟s conviction that there is no need to 
review its human rights and democratization practices. 
 
Judging from its official policy documents, Germany does seem to understand that the issue of 
human rights is fundamental, not only on the humanitarian level but also in terms of protecting 
Germany‟s own interests in the region. The democratization, pacification and stabilization of the 
area are at the centre of the EU‟s strategy for Central Asia, which was drafted in 2007 under the 
German presidency of the time and coincides almost completely with Germany‟s own. A reading of 
both German and EU official documents shows indeed a clear understanding of the importance of 
democratization and the protection of human rights. The EU document reads: “The aim of the 
European Commission‟s assistance Strategy Paper for Central Asia (2007-13) is to promote the 
stability and security of the countries of Central Asia, to assist in their pursuit of sustainable 
economic development and poverty reduction and to facilitate closer regional cooperation both 
within Central Asia and between Central Asia and the EU.”[12] However, these official statements, 
if anything, do not constitute a sufficient means of improving, or at least ensuring, the protection of 
human rights, despite the many useful projects also being implemented by the EU and Berlin in this 
field. The key will be to add even more strategic and humanitarian projects to these statements, to 
take immediate and firm action against any violations and to refuse to accede to the socio-economic 
demands of Tashkent and those of other regional governments, unless progress is made. 
Such a course of action would involve, for example, linking the payment of a „financial 
contribution” for the use of the Termez base to real action on various humanitarian issues. Germany 
should react immediately and firmly to Karimov‟s recent initiatives, make sure that any sanctions 
deemed necessary are actually applied and ensure that demands for democratization are taken 
seriously in Tashkent. Such a strategy would increase the bargaining power and the credibility of 
Germany and the EU in throughout all of Central Asia. 
 
